Abdul Amir al-Jamri – Bahrain Freedom Movement

Despite the best efforts of Bahrain’s rulers to silence him, Sheikh Abdul Amir al-Jamri, a leading Shia cleric, worked indefatigably to consolidate the Gulf state’s majority Shia population, together with secular groups of moderates and leftists, into an effective opposition movement. The object was for democracy, and equality between the Shia and minority Sunni.

About 60 to 70 per cent of the indigenous population of Bahrain is Shia, with Sunnis, including the al-Khalifa ruling family (in power since 1783), making up the rest. Traditionally, Pakistani and Indian nationals have held senior posts, with the Shia denied roles in the police and defence forces — trained by the British, whose forces withdrew from the Gulf in 1968 — and generally being treated as second-class citizens.

Sheikh al-Jamri, born in Bani Jamra, a village near the capital, Manama, was educated at home before attending the Shia Najaf Religious Institute in Iraq where he studied religious doctrine and jurisprudence. In 1972, together with other Najaf graduates, he was one of the founders of the Religious Bloc, which was formed mainly in villages in response to the announcement of an intention by the Bahraini regime to establish the first elected constituent assembly. Candidates of the bloc won nine seats in the National Council and Sheikh al-Jamri served in the short-lived parliament of 1973, raising objections to various legislative issues, including the security law.

The parliament was dissolved two years later by the then emir, Sheikh Issa bin Salam al-Khalifa, for “obstructing the work of government”. Six years later, the Islamic revolution in Iran encouraged Shia religious groups in the Gulf region to continue agitating for political representation, a fact of which the Bahraini Government was only too aware.

Until 1988 Sheikh al-Jamri worked as a judge, before being forced to leave his job because of his vocal opposition. In 1992, with others, he demanded the reinstatement of the legislature, and called for the return of political exiles and an end to the economic disparity between Sunnis and Shia. Tensions between the Sunnis and Shia escalated, with Shias attacking businesses owned by Sunnis and Indian immigrants: at least 40 people were killed. In response, the Government targeted not only Sheikh al-Jamri, but also various members of his family, including his elder son and a son-in-law, who were tortured (according to a 1997 UN report).

By 1995 the Government had banned public gatherings, and opposition leaders were put under severe restrictions, Sheikh al-Jamri was placed under house arrest. The following March, under Sheikh Issa, he was imprisoned at al-Qalaa prison, reportedly for intensifying his campaign for political reform, although no trial was ever held. The foreign minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Mubarak al-Khalifa, said that the campaign of violence was clearly organised and supported by foreign forces, and accused Sheikh al-Jamri of involvement with a “Bahraini Hezbollah” that had trained its followers in Lebanon and had links with Iran.

Tehran rejected the Bahraini Government’s accusation that Iran, which is predominantly Shia, had been behind the violent clashes. The Bahraini Freedom Movement, of which Sheikh al-Jamri’s son Mansoor was a founder, denied allegations of a plot to overthrow the Government and questioned the very existence of a Bahrain Hezbollah, accusing the Government of fabricating it in order to claim that external forces were at work within the emirate.

By the time Sheikh Hamad bin Issa al-Khalifa took over from his father as emir in 1999, the Gulf archipelago was split on sectarian, economic and political grounds. Under Sheikh Hamad, Sheikh al- Jamri was again accused of allegedly spying for a foreign power and for instigating anti-government unrest: the three years he had already spent mostly in solitary confinement was deducted from the ten-year sentence handed down.

However, he was immediately pardoned, after being compelled to make a humiliating public apology on state television and sent home, to spend the next 18 months under house arrest.

Ill-health afflicted Sheikh al-Jamri from early 2001, the same year that Sheikh Hamad announced a national charter to restore democracy and transform Bahrain into a constitutional monarchy, which gave hope to Sheikh al-Jamri and his supporters. The release of political detainees and prisoners held for their part in the unrest of 1994-99 preceded the February referendum.

Through his Friday sermons at the Diraz mosque, Sheikh al-Jamri encouraged his followers to vote in favour of the emir’s reforms.

But the following year, Sheikh al-Jamri and other influential Shia figures criticised the king’s decision to establish a second, appointed legislative house that significantly limited the power of the elected one, and called for an electoral boycott. The elected deputies were largely moderate Sunnis and independents. The invasion of Iraq by US-led forces did little to ease Shia-Sunni tensions.

Bedridden since suffering a stroke in April 2002, Sheikh al-Jamri remained a powerful mentor to the main Shia opposition party, al-Wefaq, despite playing no active role in politics for the past several years. Though his death went unmarked by Bahraini state radio and television, the Shia opposition party, the Islamic National Accord Association mourned him as “the father of the uprising of dignity in the 1990s”, and his funeral attracted thousands of followers.

Sheikh al-Jamri lived to see the first fruits of his legacy. Last month al-Wefaq won 17 of the 40 seats in the parliamentary polls, while, for the first time a Shia, Jawad bin Salem al-Oraeid, was appointed as one of three deputy prime ministers.

Sheikh al-Jamri, who was married to Zahra Attiyah, had ten children.